Is Theism Compatible with Darwinian Evolution? An Atheist's Perspective

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Is Theism Compatible with Darwinian Evolution?

[My friend Fred is a metaphysical naturalist of 50 years standing. Here is his preliminary conclusion based on the following considerations and distinctions.]

With respect to the compatibility of theism and biological evolution, I’ve come to the conclusion that there isn’t a satisfactory general answer to the question, because the answer depends both on the scope assigned to evolution and the type of theism under consideration. Let us define some terms:

THEISM: for our purposes here let’s loosely define theism as the belief in a single deity with some properties in addition to the thin, hands-off, prime mover entity of deism.

METHODOLOGICAL NATURALISM: the principle that science and history should presume that all causes are natural causes solely for the purpose of promoting successful investigation. Most scientists, whether theists or not, take this stance; indeed the Vatican does so when it investigates putative miracles, since only the cases remaining after eliminating those with a possibility of a natural explanation are candidates for being deemed miracles.

METAPHYSICAL NATURALISM: (sometimes called ontological naturalism) the hypothesis that the natural world is a closed system in the sense that nothing that is not a part of the natural world affects it; this hypothesis denies the existence of supernatural causes and entities: the natural world is all there is; there is no separate supernatural world.

EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY: the modern synthesis of Darwin’s ideas of descent with modification with population genetics (does not include abiogenesis, i.e. the evolution of the first living cell).

EVOLUTIONARY PHILOSOPHY: evolutionary biology plus metaphysical naturalism (often results in atheism).

RELIGION: (for our purposes here) a system of beliefs involving theism plus some set of religious tenets. By religious tenets, I mean the set of beliefs, often part of a religion, which are not directly entailed by its view of the deity and the properties it assigns to that deity. For example, the belief that x is a wrong act, disapproved of by the deity of the religion, often cannot be simply deduced from the beliefs about the nature of the deity per se. Likewise, whether or not a deity intervenes in the process of evolution, either at the start or at some later point, may be one of these religious tenets, not directly deducible from the assigned properties of the deity, or this capability may be part of the assigned properties of the deity.

Evolutionary philosophy can and does arise through at least two different routes:

1) Metaphysical naturalism is adopted because it is taken to be implied by evolutionary biology. In other words, someone has taken evolutionary biology on board intellectually, and from that position has inferred metaphysical naturalism from it.

2) Evolutionary biology is adopted, but metaphysical naturalism is adopted for other reasons, or for other reasons plus evolutionary biology. Evolutionary biology may be seen as a necessary condition for metaphysical naturalism, but not as a sufficient condition. My own position is that my metaphysical naturalism is based on a number of considerations, of which evolutionary biology is just one, though hardly a minor one. It’s important to remember that examples of people holding to metaphysical naturalism antedate evolutionary biology by many centuries, e.g., Lucretius and Epicurus.

Summarizing so far: evolutionary philosophy is incompatible with most commonly found types of theism, but so far here we haven’t decided the implications of evolutionary biology alone.

There are a number of different species of theism. Note that theism, as a practical matter, rarely stands alone, rather it’s almost always embedded in a religion, so that we have systems of belief with various religious tenets. It’s usually in the details of these religious tenets that the nature of a particular form of theism is spelled out and elaborated.

So, typically we have a religion consisting of theism plus some set of religious tenets, there being a variety of combinations of different kinds of theism—among the ways theistic views can differ is that different properties are assigned to the deity—with different sets of tenets. My contention is that in order to deal with the question of the compatibility of evolutionary biology with theism we should really change the question to ‘Is evolutionary biology compatible with a particular religion?’ The devil is then frequently in the details of the religious tenets, and sometimes in the details of the theism itself (e.g., the properties assigned to the deity).

SUMMARY FOR THEISM AND RELIGION: Compatibility depends crucially on the details of the religion and theism, and most often depends on the details in the religious tenets.

It’s easy to find examples of religion and/or theism with which evolutionary biology is clearly incompatible. And I would argue that it’s not that difficult to find examples of them which are compatible. Clearly, there are examples of people who claim to hold this position. So now the question becomes whether or not these people are deeply mistaken in some way about either the implications of their version of religion or theism or about the implications of evolutionary biology. There seems to be a number of people who hold that evolutionary biology implies metaphysical naturalism and a number of people who hold that it does not.

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OLD VERSION

T = theism

MLN = methodological naturalism

MPN = metaphysical naturalism

EB = evolutionary biology (does not include abiogenesis, i.e. the evolution of the first living cell)

EP = evolutionary philosophy = EB + MPN

R = a religion

EP can and does arise through at least two different routes:

1) MPN is adopted because it is taken to be implied by EB. In other words, someone has taken EB on board intellectually, and from that position has inferred MPN from it.

2) EB is adopted, but MPN is adopted for other reasons, or for other reasons plus EB. EB may be seen as a necessary condition for MPN, but not as a sufficient condition. My own position is that my MPN is based on a number of considerations, of which EB is just one, though hardly a minor one. It’s important to remember that examples of people holding to MPN antedate EB by many centuries, e.g., Lucretius and Epicurus.

Summarizing so far: EP is incompatible with most commonly found types of T, but so far here we haven’t decided the implications of EB alone.

There are a number of different species of T. Note that T, as a practical matter, rarely stands alone, rather it’s almost always embedded in a religion, so that we have systems of belief with various religious tenets (RT). It’s usually in the details of these RTs that the nature of a particular form of T is spelled out and elaborated.

So, we have R = T + RT. (all terms may come in different instantiations: R1, T1, RT1 etc.)

My contention is that in order to deal with the question of compatibility of EB with T we should really change the question to “Is EB compatible with R?” The devil is then frequently in the details of RT, and sometimes in the details of T.

Summary for T and R: Compatibility depends crucially on the details of R and T, and most often depends on the details in RT.

It’s easy to find examples of R and/or T with which EB is clearly incompatible. And I would argue that it’s not that difficult to find examples of them which are compatible. Clearly, there are examples of people who claim to hold this position. So now the question becomes whether or not these people are deeply mistaken in some way about either the implications of their version of R or T or about the implications of EB. There seems to be a number of people who hold that EB implies MPN and a number of people who hold that it does not.

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