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Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil? Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?

David Hume (paraphrasing Epicurus c. 300 BC)

I think that four rational inferences can be extracted from Hume’s paraphrase of Epicurus:

1) If God is willing to prevent evil but not able, then he is not omnipotent.

2) If God is able to prevent evil but is not willing, then he is malevolent.

3) If God is both able and willing to prevent evil, then evil would not exist.

4) If God is neither able nor willing to prevent evil, then he is not God.

Which of those four statements contain logical (i.e. necessary or demonstrative) inferences and which contain non-demonstrative inferences? In my opinion, only 1) and 3) are logical inferences, while 2) and 4) are non-demonstrative inferences. In other words, Hume’s formulation of Epicurus’s argument against God’s existence from the problem of evil is not logically coercive. It convinces some people; it fails to convince others.

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